The previous chapter discussed the possibility of employing the virtual worlds of computer simulations and videogames to influence human cognition at a basic, structural level. Even when directed toward more practical fields of application, such as ethics and self-discovery, the perspectives on the philosophy of technology offered in Chapter 4 examined the possibilities and effects of digital mediation in very abstract and almost entirely theoretical terms.
This chapter continues and deepens the discussion on the ontological shifts triggered and encouraged by experiencing digitally-mediated (and often unworldly) worlds, it also begins to integrate theoretical insights with examples and observations derived from the practice of videogame design. The analysis of three different videogames -philosophical videogames that I designed or with which I was otherwise creatively involved -provides examples and inspiration to discuss and understand what is it like to develop thought with the assistance of computer simulations, both as a creator of worlds and as a subject in those worlds.
In this chapter, the practice of "doing philosophy" will be proposed as a specific form of mediation of thought that is supplementary to the philosophical tradition of textual expression and could even, in extreme cases, constitute an alternative to it. Don Ihde presented a similar perspective when he wrote that "[w]ithout entering into the doing, the basic thrust and import of phenomenology is likely to be misunderstood 5 Augmented Ontologies and a Challenge to Western Philosophy: Videogames and Simulations as Mediators of Human Thought and Experience at the least or missed at the most" (Ihde, 1986, 14) . Embracing postphenomenology as a philosophical framework helps to reveal the practice of doing within digital simulations (in the sense of both creating virtual worlds and acting within them) as a novel and experiential branch of philosophy.
What is it like to be a (digital) bat?
In explaining the difficulties in the articulation of an objective physicalist approach to the philosophy of mind, Thomas Nagel argued in his 1974 essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" that human subjectivity is inescapably confined within the experience of what it is like to be a human being. Nagel began his essay with the assumption that empirical observations provide the basic material from which human beings perform any cognitive process. Experience is not only presented as the fundamental substrate for the construction of ontologies, but also as the essential ground from which human beings may imagine and adopt alternative worldviews. Based on that postulation, Nagel maintained that it must be impossible to widen or alter human subjectivity by representational means. According to Nagel, the subjective imagination needed to make sense of representational media can only suggest what it would be like for a human subject to perceive and behave as a bat. This is precisely because the subjectivity of a bat is not presented immediately and objectively to human beings. Rather, people experience what it could be like to be a bat through the existing filters of the perceptual, cognitive, and operational structures that constitute human subjectivity. What it is like for a human subject to perceive and behave as a bat was not, however, Nagel's concern. He wanted, instead, to ascertain whether humans could ever be capable of knowing what it is like for a bat to be a bat.
As outlined above, Nagel claimed that only experiences that have the quality of being objective can be used in a physicalist model. As a consequence of this fundamental stance, as is already suggested by the question posed in the title of Nagel's essay, it appeared evident to the American philosopher that the answer he was looking for could not be found in the context of the capability of the human mind to abstract and fantasize. What Nagel believed, in very practical terms, is that, in trying to understand what it is like to be a bat, it does not help to:
imagine to have webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system
